Key takeaways
Brisbane recorded the steepest monthly decline of any Australian capital in September, falling 1.5% and taking values 5.4% below the May peak, effectively erasing ten months of gains and returning the market to roughly December 2025 levels.
Median time on market has doubled from 17 days a year ago to 37 days today, which is why advertised listings have climbed 55% even though new listings nationally are running 9.2% below year-ago levels.
Brisbane's sales volumes are down 27% year-on-year, the largest transaction contraction of any capital city, confirming that the supply buildup is a demand failure rather than a seller exodus, a distinction that limits how disorderly the correction becomes.
Brisbane has done something this month that would have been unthinkable a year ago: it recorded the steepest monthly price fall of any Australian capital city.
Values dropped 1.5% in September, edging past Sydney's 1.4% decline and taking the market 5.4% below its May peak. That decline has effectively erased ten months of gains.
Brisbane values are now back to where they sat in December last year, a complete round trip through what had been one of the most confident growth markets in the country.
The reversal becomes starker when measured against where Brisbane was six months ago.
In March it was posting monthly gains above 1%. It now posts monthly losses above 1%.
Among the mid-sized capitals that swing is the sharpest, and it happened without any single identifiable trigger beyond demand simply draining out of the market.
The scale of the demand withdrawal is the headline story.
Brisbane home sales are running 27% below year-ago levels, the largest transaction collapse of any capital city in the country, ahead of Sydney at 26.5% and Perth at 24.2%.
More than a quarter of the buyer pool that existed twelve months ago has stopped transacting entirely.
Brisbane Market Performance
Three figures define Brisbane's September: the steepest monthly fall nationally, the steepest sales decline nationally, and a listings increase that dwarfs every other capital.
They are not three separate problems. They are one problem measured three ways.
| Segment / Metric | Current Result | Trend & Context |
|---|---|---|
| Monthly Change (September) | -1.5% | Steepest monthly decline of any capital city |
| Decline Since May Peak | -5.4% | Values back to roughly December 2025 levels |
| Home Sales Volume | -27% vs. year ago | Largest transaction contraction nationally |
| Advertised Listings | +55% vs. year ago | Among the sharpest supply increases of any capital |
| Median Days on Market | 37 days | More than double the 17 days recorded a year ago |
| National Context | 97% of capital suburbs falling | Brisbane leading a now-universal downturn |
Source: Cotality, October 2026
Seventeen Days to Thirty-Seven
The single number that best captures what has happened to Brisbane is not the price fall. It is the median time on market.
A year ago, the typical Brisbane property sold in 17 days. Today it takes 37. More than double. For a market where properties routinely went under contract before the second open home, that shift represents a complete inversion of how transactions work.
Everything else follows from it.
When each listing sits on the market twice as long, inventory accumulates even if the flow of new listings stays flat, and across the capitals, new listings are actually running 9.2% below year-ago levels.
Brisbane's 55% increase in advertised supply is therefore not a story about sellers rushing for the exit. It is a story about the exit being blocked.
Note: Brisbane's listings have climbed 55% while sales fell 27%, the stock is piling up because buyers stopped showing, not because vendors started panicking.
That distinction carries real weight for what comes next. Supply created by seller panic tends to keep pushing prices down until the excess clears.
Supply created by buyer absence can unwind quickly if confidence returns, because the underlying pipeline of new stock is thin.
Brisbane is firmly in the second category, which does not prevent further falls, but does limit how disorderly they become.
Where the Rental Squeeze Finally Gave
After years of relentless tightening, the national rental market has started to release pressure. and the way it happened says more about tenants than about landlords.
The national vacancy rate rose to 2.1% in September, up from February's record low of 1.5% and the highest since January 2025. That remains well below the pre-COVID decade average of 3.3%, but the direction of travel has genuinely reversed.
The curious part is that this loosening occurred despite a sharp drop in investment activity, which ordinarily reduces rental stock rather than expanding it.
The explanation almost certainly sits with renters themselves.
Weekly rents are up around $200 over five years and rental affordability is at the worst level on record, conditions that push households to combine, move in with family, or accept smaller places further out.
Fewer separate tenancies means more vacant properties, even without new supply arriving.
Monthly rent growth has slowed to 0.3% seasonally adjusted, the smallest monthly increase since May 2025, with annual growth easing to 5.5%.
| Rental & Investment Metric | Current Status & Trends |
|---|---|
| National Vacancy Rate | 2.1% — highest since January 2025, up from 1.5% in February |
| Monthly Rent Growth | 0.3% — smallest monthly increase since May 2025 |
| Annual Rent Growth | 5.5% — easing from earlier peaks |
| 5-Year Rent Increase | Approximately $200 per week above 2021 levels |
| National Gross Rental Yield | 3.85% — highest since August 2019 |
| Brisbane Median Days on Market | 37 days — up from 17 days a year ago |
Source: Cotality, October 2026
Gross yields nationally have reached 3.85%, the best since August 2019, and should keep improving while rents rise against falling values.
But the gross figure flatters the reality.
For investors entering now, high interest costs stacked on top of rising insurance premiums, maintenance bills and management fees still make neutral cash flow difficult to reach, and Brisbane's recent capital losses remove the growth component that used to compensate.
A Fifteen-Year High Meets a Modern Debt Load
The Reserve Bank has pushed the cash rate to its highest level in 15 years, and the historical comparison is more misleading than it first appears.
Rates reached this level before, but household balance sheets did not look like they do now.
Australian borrowers carry considerably more debt relative to income than they did fifteen years ago, which means an identical rate produces a materially larger drag.
For Brisbane, where a substantial share of recent buyers entered near the top of a 64%-plus growth run, that sensitivity is particularly acute.
The immediate consequences are mechanical: borrowing capacity contracts, serviceability assessments tighten, and repayments climb for existing mortgage holders.
These land alongside rising living costs and negative real income growth, shrinking both the number of buyers who can qualify and the amount they can commit.
Tip: Brisbane buyers now have 55% more properties to consider and twice as long to decide, after two years of competing against multiple offers within a fortnight, the leverage has genuinely shifted.
Affordability has improved only modestly despite the 5.4% fall, because the preceding boom was so large and mortgage rates have risen so far.
Values remain high relative to household incomes, deposit thresholds are substantial, and pessimistic consumer sentiment continues to delay the kind of major financial commitment a home purchase represents.
The federal budget's tax changes compound this. Less favourable negative gearing and capital gains tax settings have reduced investor demand and dented confidence more broadly, and Brisbane attracted significant investor capital throughout its growth years.
The Floor Beneath Brisbane
Two structural factors are working to contain the decline rather than accelerate it.
Employment has held up. A stable labour market protects household incomes and limits the risk of rising mortgage arrears or forced selling — the mechanism that turns corrections into collapses. Any meaningful deterioration in employment would change this materially, but it is not evident in current conditions.
New construction supply remains persistently short. Elevated construction and infrastructure costs, capacity constraints and difficult project economics continue to hold back completions. Even where approvals and starts improve, the long lead times mean years pass before finished homes reach the market, which supports values wherever advertised supply stays low.
The balance of risks has clearly shifted to the downside.
Further declines are the most likely outcome while rates remain elevated, affordability stays constrained and sentiment stays cautious.
What determines the depth is a short list: how long rates hold at current levels, whether the labour market softens materially, and how quickly buyer confidence begins to rebuild.




